The war of memorial narratives: GENOCOST at the heart of the Kinshasa–Kigali rift

Every 2 August, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) observes "GENOCOST" day (genocide for economic gain), intended to commemorate the millions of victims of decades of armed conflict in the east of the country. While the day answers a legitimate demand for remembrance and justice from the Congolese people, it also sits at the centre of a violent diplomatic, political and semantic confrontation between Kinshasa and Kigali. Through a methodical deconstruction of the competing narratives, this article examines the flaws in the Congolese concept, Rwanda's defensive strategy, and the institutional opacity surrounding the management of reparations in Kinshasa.

1. The competing narratives: from national mobilisation to diplomatic clash

For the Congolese government, led by President Félix Tshisekedi, GENOCOST is presented as the official memorial framework honouring the victims of what Kinshasa calls a "Rwandan aggression" continuing for three decades. The official Congolese narrative holds that the successive wars in the east are not purely internal conflicts but a criminal enterprise orchestrated by Kigali and its armed proxies historically the RCD, the CNDP, and today the M23 with the aim of occupying Congolese territory and methodically plundering its mineral resources (coltan, gold, cassiterite). On this reading, the phrase "economic genocide" is meant to tie the suffering of civilians directly to the financial appetites of the sub-region and of multinational companies.

Rwandan authorities, by contrast, categorically reject this framing. Kigali describes GENOCOST as a politically constructed conspiracy theory with no recognised legal or historical foundation. According to Rwandan diplomacy, the DRC's use of this terminology pursues a twofold objective: to export responsibility for the structural weaknesses of the Congolese state onto an external scapegoat, and to sustain a form of revisionism aimed at relativising or distorting the memory of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

The official positions in summary

• On the characterisation of the facts: the Congolese government describes the abuses committed in the east as "genocide for the purpose of economic plunder" (GENOCOST), asserting a moral duty of remembrance and a right to financial reparation for the victims. The Rwandan authorities firmly reject the term, viewing it as the political instrumentalisation of massacres arising from regional wars, and accusing Kinshasa of seeking to rewrite history while trivialising the memory of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.
• On the security question: Kinshasa designates Rwanda as a direct aggressor operating on Congolese soil through the M23, demanding international sanctions and the withdrawal of foreign troops to restore its sovereignty. Kigali, conversely, sees the M23 as a purely Congolese rebel movement fighting to defend a persecuted Tutsi minority. For Rwanda, the major security threat remains the alliance between the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and the Hutu FDLR militia, seen as a direct existential risk.

2. A critical analysis of the GENOCOST concept: linguistic inconsistency and legal vagueness

A rigorous analysis of the GENOCOST concept reveals numerous flaws that weaken the DRC's diplomatic position internationally. Although the term was originally coined in 2013 by activist movements in the Congolese diaspora in London to raise awareness of the humanitarian tragedy, its recent institutionalisation by the Congolese state suffers from major conceptual weaknesses.

The dead end of ethnic framing: defining the "Bantu"

One of the major contradictions highlighted by researchers and academics lies in the ethnic framing sometimes propagated by GENOCOST advocates and by certain state bodies such as FONAREV (the National Fund for Reparations for Victims of Sexual Violence linked to Crimes against the Peace and Security of Humanity). The claim that GENOCOST denotes a "massacre of Bantu by Tutsi" rests on a problematic scientific and historical misconception.

Anthropologically and linguistically, the term "Bantu" designates no homogeneous ethnic group or single people, but a vast language family comprising several hundred languages spoken across central, eastern and southern Africa. More significantly still, linguistic classifications include speakers of Kinyarwanda and Kirundi within that zone. The binary, ethnicised opposition between "Bantu" and "Tutsi" is therefore an ideological simplification devoid of scientific rigour, one that risks reviving inter-ethnic hate speech within the Great Lakes region itself.

Separating the duty of remembrance from legal characterisation

At the official commemorations of 2 August 2026 in Kinshasa, President Félix Tshisekedi himself acknowledged the need for a fundamental distinction:

The statement reflects a belated realisation at the summit of the state: while remembrance is an inalienable right for a wounded people, the characterisation of "genocide" is governed by very strict standards set by international law, notably the 1948 UN Convention.

In international law, genocide requires formal proof of an intentio specialis (the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such). By characterising crimes committed in wars of aggression or economic plunder as "genocide", Kinshasa creates legal confusion. International law already characterises these acts as war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of aggression — perfectly established categories that require no hybrid, internationally contested concept.

3. Kigali's response: national security, protection of minorities and a media counter-offensive

On the Rwandan side, the reading of the crisis rests on two inseparable pillars: national security in the face of residual threats from the 1994 genocide, and the protection of Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese populations (notably Congolese Tutsi) subjected to discrimination and targeted violence in eastern DRC.

• National security: Kigali consistently points out that the original source of instability in eastern DRC dates back to the 1994 retreat of the Rwandan armed forces (FAR) and the Interahamwe militias that perpetrated the genocide against the Tutsi. The persistent alliance or tactical collaboration between the regular Congolese army (FARDC) and the Hutu FDLR militia (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) is, for Rwanda, an absolute national-security red line.
• Protection of minorities: in the Rwandan account, the M23 rebel movement is regarded not as a puppet of Kigali but as a legitimate self-defence force against the persecution suffered by the Congolese Tutsi community. The M23's grievances concern the non-implementation of earlier peace agreements, the denial of nationality, and the Congolese state's inability to neutralise the extremist armed groups that threaten their existence.

4. FONAREV's opacity and the question of governance in Kinshasa

Beyond the ideological and diplomatic battle, the internal management of remembrance and reparations in the DRC raises very serious ethical and financial questions. Created by Congolese law in 2022, FONAREV is tasked with collecting funds and redistributing reparations to victims of violence. The fund is chiefly financed by a compulsory 11% levy on the mining royalty owed to the state.

Citizen-monitoring reports and financial investigations, however, point to dramatic opacity surrounding the use of these substantial public resources:

• Resources collected: since its creation, FONAREV has accumulated more than 200 million US dollars from the mining royalty, levied in the name of relieving the suffering of victims in the east.
• Share actually reaching victims: according to various independent estimates and civil-society audits, less than 2.5% to 3% of the funds collected have actually reached direct victims in the form of medical, psychological or financial assistance.
• Allegations of mismanagement: several critical voices, including complaints filed before international and European courts, denounce opaque management of FONAREV's resources. Senior figures in the Kinshasa government, as well as circles close to the presidency and to the entourage of President Félix Tshisekedi's wife, have been named in cases of alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of these funds intended for victims.

The situation creates a striking contrast: while the Congolese government deploys aggressive diplomacy and substantial budgetary means to stage GENOCOST commemorations around the world, survivors of the massacres in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri continue to live in complete destitution, without access to basic care or to the promised reparations.

5. The imperative of dialogue and regional cooperation: the position of Daraja Média

As a media outlet committed to truth, justice and stability in the Great Lakes region, Daraja Média believes it is imperative to move beyond the war of memorial slogans and the political instrumentalisation of people's suffering.

The Congolese position — seeking to impose the GENOCOST concept without solid international legal foundations while allowing unacceptable financial opacity to persist around FONAREV — weakens its own cause. Systematically accusing the neighbour without accepting responsibility for internal governance, corruption and the reform of its own security forces is a strategic dead end.

Equally, lasting peace cannot be achieved unless Rwanda and the DRC engage in sincere dialogue, free of confrontational posturing. Rwanda's security and the DRC's sovereignty are not mutually exclusive; they are interdependent. The definitive neutralisation of denialist and terrorist groups such as the FDLR, the effective protection of all ethnicised minorities, and an end to all support for armed rebellions are the indispensable preconditions.

In the final analysis, the economic future of the two nations depends on their capacity to turn a frontier of conflict into a space of peaceful coexistence and sub-regional economic integration. The natural resources of the Great Lakes must cease to be the engine of war and become the lever of shared development, guaranteeing at last the dignity and security of every citizen in the region.